We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents' utility functions preclude transferable utility (a property we call "Almost TU"). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash Bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to household decision-making in the context of the Rotten Kid Theorem and in evaluating a change in family taxation.
Introduction
Solidarity is a crucially important consideration whenever individuals cooperatively decide on how to allocate resources among themselves: an agreement is unlikely to be reached if some are hurt while others bene…t in the event of a foreseeable shock in the available resources. From a normative standpoint, solidarity is also a chief concern when making policy recommendations, as illustrated by the following slightly modi…ed example found in Nash (1950) .
1 Suppose Jack and Bill are siblings and have to share the following items: a book, a whip, a ball, a bat, a box, a pen, a toy, a knife, and a hat. Now suppose the parents take away the whip and the knife and replace them with a bucket and a shovel. It may be a relief for them to know that they will either disappoint both children or delight them both. In other words, the parents may want to make sure that their action does not destabilize their children's bonding by making one child better o¤ and the other worse o¤ and thus giving the impression that parents favor one child over the other. On a larger scale, a government may take a similar stance when it comes to family policies: it may be desirable to know that a change in family policies such as changes in parental leave policies or family taxation, -policies that clearly change a family's production possibility set -do not leave some family members worse o¤ and others better o¤, which could unduly stress intrafamily relationships.
In practice, however, most bargaining situations which draw upon the results of axiomatic bargaining typically do so using some generalized utilitarian bargaining solution (GUBS). This broad class of solutions consists of maximizing an additively separable social choice function and includes the utilitarian and Nash bargaining solutions. Despite their appealing properties (Moulin 1988) , bargaining solutions in the GUBS class typically fail to satisfy solidarity (Chun and Thomson 1988) unless agents'utility is transferable. Yet, transferable utility (TU) is a very strong assumption which forbids taking into account commonly observed features of individual preferences such as diminishing marginal utility and, by extension, risk aversion. Hence, for most practical purposes, the use of the class of GUBS seems rather limited in applications.
We remedy the issue by establishing that well-behaved GUBS (to be de…ned) satisfy solidarity on a broader utility class than TU, which we de…ne and call Almost TU. Almost TU requires the same ordinal properties as TU but allows for cardinal properties like diminishing marginal utility as well. Hence, our result broadens the valid range of applications for bargaining solutions of the GUBS class.
2 Also, from an implementation standpoint, policy makers may be unsure of the cardinal properties of agents' utility functions when evaluating the change in welfare due to a change in policy. Hence they may be reassured to know that the utility of the agents will change in the same direction even in the event of a misestimation of these cardinal properties, as long as the ordinal properties for TU are satis…ed.
More precisely, our main result (Theorem 1) characterizes Almost TU as the domain on which all well-behaved GUBS satisfy solidarity. We then present two applications where our main result bears useful consequences. First, in family policies, changes in family taxation amount to changes in the production possibility set of the household. Consequently, knowing that the solidarity property holds helps decrease the number of dimensions of possible opposition to a policy change (i.e., only interhousehold tensions will have to be considered, but not intrahousehold tensions).
Even if a GUBS satis…es the solidarity property, there is still a possibility that a change in the utility possibility set a¤ects agents' utilities in opposite ways. This happens if not only joint production possibilities change but the stand-alone utilities of agents change as well (see section 6 for examples). Yet, even in this case, Almost TU in combination with a GUBS remains useful as it allows us to decompose the impact of such a change into a "utility possibility set" e¤ect (agents share the gain or the pain holding the disagreement point …xed) and a "disagreement point" e¤ect (di¤erent agents may experience changes in their utility at the disagreement point in opposing directions).
The second application we o¤er concerns the question of incentive compatibility (Theorem 2) and as an application we present a Rotten Kid Theorem that holds on the wider domain of Almost TU instead of TU. Becker (1974) introduced the Rotten Kid theorem as a means of reconciling the treatment of a multi-person household as one agent (the so-called unitary model) with methodological individualism. Becker states that if the head of the household "cares su¢ ciently about all other [household] members to transfer general resources to them, then redistribution of income among members would not a¤ect the consumption of any member, as long as the head continues to contribute to all" (p. 1076). The reason for this income pooling behavior is that "if a head exists, other members also are motivated to maximize family income and consumption, even if their welfare depends on their own consumption alone" (p. 1080). Bergstrom (1989) restates Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem after introducing what he calls "the game rotten kids play" (p. 1145). This game consists of two-stages. In the …rst stage, each family member chooses an action. The vector of actions taken by the family members results in a speci…c amount of wealth and distribution of consumption goods for each family member. In the second stage, the household head makes money transfers to the household members after observing their actions. If the Rotten Kid Theorem holds, it is possible for the head to fully compensate household members, who put themselves in an unfavorable position in the …rst stage through an action that bene…ts others, by means of these second-stage money transfers. Bergstrom then shows that the theorem only holds when utility is transferable. In comparison to Bergstrom, we can weaken the requirement of TU to Almost TU by imposing a stronger, yet reasonable condition on the head's altruistic utility function.
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Related Literature
Many works emphasize the importance of solidarity in allocation problems, be it with respect to population or to the total amount of goods available (see Moulin 1988 , or Sprumont 2008 , for a survey). This work belongs to the latter strand of the literature and is more closely related to Chun and Thomson (1988) , which explicits the parallel between fair allocation problems and bargaining situations. Chun and Thomson (1988) show that the solidarity property holds in a one-good economy for some bargaining solutions. Our main result generalizes theirs to a many-goods production economy when preferences exhibit Almost TU.
In the context of axiomatic bargaining, many characterizations of bargaining solutions are motivated by at least some notion of solidarity or monotonicity arguments.
3 Xu and Yoshihara (2008) o¤er a systematic treatment of wellknown bargaining rules with respect to solidarity-type axioms.
Although we motivate the interest in the solidarity property as a normative issue, our result also has implications for incentive compatibility. In an application of our main theorem we draw a connection to Bergstrom's (1989) treatment of the Rotten Kid Theorem. 4 Bergstrom shows that each child behaves so as to maximize the head of household's altruistic utility function if and only if utility is transferable. By strengthening the assumption on the altruistic parent's preferences to be of the form of a well-behaved GUBS rather than just treating each child' s utility as a normal good, we present a Rotten Kid Theorem that holds for Almost TU, not just TU.
The issue of incentive compatibility also arises in a model in which spouses need to take individual actions in order to produce goods that they will later distribute among themselves. Based on Gugl (2009) we provide such a model of "Rotten Spouses" in section 6.1. Almost TU takes care of two issues at once: Assuming Almost TU, the class of well-behaved GUBS satis…es the solidarity property as well as incentive compatibility.
The Model
Consider a population N = f1; 2; :::; ng of agents who produce L 2 goods. These goods may include public goods, but at least one good is private. More precisely, the population faces a production possibility set Y R L + that is a closed, convex and comprehensive set. If we denote by y 2 R L + a particular product mix, then @Y , the production possibility frontier of Y , and the corre-3 Individual monotonicity is the property that distinguishes the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from the Nash Bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) . 4 There has been renewed interest in the Rotten Kid Theorem in explaining the economics of child labor (Baland and Robinson 2000, and Bommier and Dubois 2004) . The question of whether or not TU is a reasonable assumption in this context plays a crucial role in these two papers. We denote by x i = (x i1 ; x i2 ; :::; x iL ) 2 R L + agent i's consumption vector. A distribution of y is a list of consumption vectors, one per agent, x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) such that: P i2N x il = y l for any private good, l, and x ik = x jk = y k for all i; j 2 N and any public good, k:
For any product mix y, we denote by X(y) the set of distributions of y and by
The preferences of each agent i are represented by a utility function, u i , which is non-decreasing, concave and twice di¤erentiable from R L + to R.
5 We denote by U the class of such utility functions. A utility pro…le is a collection of utility functions, (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ) 2 U N , one per agent. An economy is a pair
u(x) = g the utility possibility set corresponding to the economy (Y; u). It follows from our assumptions on an economy that U (Y ) is a closed, convex, and comprehensive set. We denote by @U (Y; u) the Pareto frontier of U (Y; u); i.e., @U (Y;
We shall consider that agents cooperatively manage the economy, in the form of a bargaining process, with the possibility that agents disagree on how to do so. Hence, we denote by d i agent i's stand-alone utility level and call d = (d 1 ; d 2 ; :::; d n ) 2 U (Y; u) the disagreement point of the bargaining process. We denote by the pair (U (Y; u); d) the corresponding bargaining problem. Note that we take the view that the disagreement point may depend on the utility pro…le, u, but is independent of the cooperative production possibilities, Y .
A bargaining solution is a function, S : R N R N ! U (Y; u), mapping to each bargaining problem a utility vector in the corresponding utility possibility set such that S(U (Y; u); d) = d and S(U (Y; u); d) 2 @U (Y; u). We denote by S the class of bargaining solutions. A family of bargaining solutions we shall consider is that of generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (GUBS) where, for each bargaining solution in this class, there exists a list of n concave, strictly increasing, and continuous functions, ( 1 ; 2 ; ::
Note that GUBS is a wide family of bargaining solutions; both the utilitarian solution and the Nash bargaining solution belong to GUBS, with i = 1 and i = ln( ) for all i, respectively. More precisely, we denote by G the subclass of GUBS for which the i 's are strictly concave; thus the Nash Bargaining solution belongs to G. The utilitarian solution belongs to another subclass of GUBS, the weighted utilitarian bargaining solutions (WUBS): A bargaining solution W belonging to WUBS is characterized by a list of n non-negative weights, (! 1 ; ! 2 ; :::; ! n ) 2 R N + , with
To ensure uniqueness of the solution in case @U (Y; u) is an (n 1)-dimensional hyperplane, we shall consider only the subfamily of WUBS which break ties along a non-decreasing path of R N + : A non-decreasing path is a function :
(t) = ( 1 (t); 2 (t); :::; n (t)) non-decreasing in each coordinate with (0) = d and
We denote by W the family of WUBS breaking ties along a non-decreasing path. 7 We refer to a G [ W as the class of well-behaved GUBS.
We say that a bargaining solution, S, satis…es Solidarity in production opportunities under utility pro…le u if one of the following vector inequality holds:
Almost Transferable Utility
In this section we de…ne the new concept of Almost Transferable Utility. In order to do so, we …rst recall what is meant by a product mix being e¢ cient independently of distribution, a necessary (and su¢ cient) condition for (Almost) TU to hold. The conditions under which a product mix is e¢ cient independently of distribution are well established in the literature by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) and Bergstrom and Varian (1985) . Our analysis below is not meant to reestablish these results but to apply the concept to introduce Almost TU.
E¢ ciency Independent of Distribution
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We denote by EX(y; u) = fx 2 X(y)j@x 0 2 X(y); u(x 0 ) u(x)g the set of exchange e¢ cient distributions in X(y) relative to the utility pro…le u and by
u(x)g the set of (Pareto) e¢ cient allocations in the economy (Y; u).
For any given y 2 Y , we say that x 2 X (y) is interior exchange e¢ cient if and only if:
for all i; j 2 N , for all private goods l; m:
We denote by EX (y; u) the set of interior exchange e¢ cient distributions of X(y) relative to the utility pro…le u: We say that a product mix and distribution pair (y; x) 2 Y X(y) is interior e¢ cient if and only if the following holds:
for all i 2 N , and all private goods l; m and P
for any public good k and any private good m.
(1) The …rst family of equalities states that all agents' marginal rates of substitutions (MRS) between any two private goods,
@xmi ; must equal the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between these goods,
@xm . The second set of equalities are the Samuelson conditions for public goods.
We say that e¢ ciency is independent of distribution if there exists y 2 Y such that, for all 2 @U (Y; u), = u (x) for some x 2 X (y) : In words, all points on the utility possibility frontier are achieved via various distributions of the same product mix. It follows from (1) that y is associated with a vector of marginal rates of substitution at the exchange e¢ cient distributions-one per pair of goods-which is independent of the utility level achieved by any agent. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration in the case of two private goods, strictly quasi-concave utility functions and a strictly convex production possibility set. In the …gure, neither y nor y 0 are e¢ cient, because the value of the MRS associated with EX (y; u) is di¤erent from the MRT at y; similarly for y 0 . The product mix associated with any e¢ cient allocation, y 00 , lies on @Y between y and y 0 , where the MRS of EX (y 00 ; u) equals the MRT at y 00 .
Figure 1: E¢ ciency independent of distribution: All e¢ cient distributions aggregate up to the same product mix y 00 :
In the case of public and private goods, for a product mix to be e¢ cient independently of distribution requires that the sum of marginal rates of substitution stays the same for a given level of the public good y k no matter how the total amount of the private good y l is distributed.
Transferable Utility
A utility pro…le, u 2 U N , satis…es Transferable Utility (Bergstrom 1989) if for any given Y 2 R L + , the following holds:
Note that resource and technological constraints as given by Y only play a role in the size of : If TU holds, e¢ ciency is independent of distribution (Bergstrom and Cornes 1983, and Bergstrom and Varian 1985) . If we take agents' utility to be ordinal, the converse is also true. Bergstrom and his co-authors give an exhaustive list of agents' utility functions that lead to TU. Agents' utility functions must allow the indirect utility representation of the Gorman Polar 8
Form in an economy with only private goods (Bergstrom and Varian 1985) and a form dual to the Gorman Polar form in an economy with public and private goods (Bergstrom and Cornes 1981 and 1983) .
Example 1 Finding the utility possibility frontier with TU. a) Two private goods, two agents.
Indeed, because both agents have identical preferences for any given y 2 Y; dividing all goods equally must be exchange e¢ cient, i.e. x = 1 2 y 1 ;
A private and a public good, two agents. Suppose preferences over a private good and a public good are quasi-linear such that
where h i ( ) is a strictly concave function. Then the segment of the utility possibility frontier at which TU holds consists of all the points on the line from
where the vector (y 1 ; y 2 ) is found by arg max y2Y y 1 +h 1 (y 2 )+h 2 (y 2 ) ; and = max y2Y
More generally, when TU holds, one can …nd @U (Y; u) in two steps. First,
Almost Transferable Utility
Whether a product mix is e¢ cient independently of distribution, depends solely on the ordinal properties of the agents'utility functions. If they are such that a product mix is e¢ cient independently of distribution, but their cardinal properties prohibit the particular utility representation that would lead to TU, then there must exist positive monotonic transformations,
However, f i ( i ) no longer represents an agent's utility. Hence, we say that pro…le u 2 U N exhibits Almost Transferable Utility (Almost TU) if, for any given Y , the utility possibility frontier is of the form
Since u i is assumed to be concave, it follows that f i must be an increasing, and convex function. The intuition is that in order to recover a linear constraint, one needs constant "marginal utility of money." Hence, given that strict concavity of u i leads to decreasing marginal utility of money, a strictly convex transformation is required to undo this e¤ect. b) Suppose the cardinal utility function of agent i over a private good (x 1i ) and a public good (x 2 ) is given by u i = (x 1i + h i (x 2 )) i ; where h i ( ) is a strictly concave function and i 2 (0; 1). Then the segment of the utility possibility frontier at which Almost TU holds consists of the endpoints
2 ) and of all points ( 1 ; 2 ) between these endpoints for which
; where the vector (y 1 ; y 2 ) is found by arg max y2Y y 1 + h 1 (y 2 ) + h 1 (y 2 ) ; and = max y2Y y 1 + h 1 (y 2 ) + h 1 (y 2 ) :
In the following example (Almost) TU does not hold; although there exists a Y such that U (Y; u) forms a simplex, it is not the case for all production possibility sets.
Example 3 Three private goods, two agents. Let u 1 and u 2 be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave and homogenous of degree one. Moreover, let u 1 = u (x 11 ; x 21 ) ; u 2 = u (x 12 ; x 32 ) : That is, good 3 replaces good 2 in agent 2s utility function as compared to that of agent 1's. Let (Y; u 1 ) = max y2Y u (x 11 ; x 21 ) and (Y; u 2 ) = max y2Y u (x 12 ; x 32 ) : Consider the production possibility set given by Y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 ) 2 R 3 + jy 1 + p 2 y 2 + p 3 y 3 I with p 2 ; p 3 ; I > 0 and p 2 = p 3 = p: Then, (Y; u 1 ) = (Y; u 2 ) and @U (Y; u) = f( 1 ; 2 ) 2 U (Y; u) :
(Y 0 ;u2) = 1g: (Almost) TU is violated. Proof see Appendix.
Results
We now consider what happens if Almost TU holds and the production possibility set changes.
Lemma Given Almost TU, a change in the production possibilities of the economy can only result in an expansion or a contraction of the utility possibility set:
We now state our main theorem. Proof. For su¢ ciency, note that for any S 2 G [ W, a …rst step-and, in case of S 2 G, also the last step-to …nding S is by solving the following:
In what follows, it will be useful to work with v i = f i ( i ), such that the above problem becomes
and then …nding the corresponding i from i = f 1 i (v i ): Chun and Thomson (1988) show that if agents have concave utility functions over one good only, and this good's supply increases, both agents bene…t under the Nash bargaining solution. The authors remark that the result extends to any bargaining solution in G (Chun and Thomson 1988, p. 19) . When problem (2) is presented as (3) ; a change in (Y; f (u)) due to a change in Y has the same impact on v as a change in the only good has on agents' utilities in Chun and Thomson (1988) 's onegood economy. Thus their proof applies to our problem (3) for any G2G such that lim xi!0 g i = 1. In addition, our proof of su¢ ciency below also handles the subclass W of GUBS, the possibility of corner solutions 9 , and accounts for d 6 = (0; 0) : Suppose Almost TU holds, and let
the solution vector in the v-space.
Case 1:
> 0 for at least n 1 values of i 2 N . It follows that v is the unique element of @f (U (Y; u)) such that the following expression holds: 8 < :
where i (resp. j ) is the utility level of agent i (resp. agent j) when she does not receive any private good. The left hand side of (4) depends on v i only, and the right hand side of (4) depends on v j only: Since f 
is nonincreasing in v i (resp.v j ). Therefore, for (4) to hold as changes values, v i and v j must change in the same direction, thus proving the result.
Case 2:
> 0 for at most n 2 values of i 2 N . If S 2 G, v is the unique element of @f (U (Y; u)) for which expression (4) holds and the argument of Case 1 follows through. Now, suppose S 2 W, with ! 2 R n + its associated weights, there may be more than one v 2 @f (U (Y; u)) for which expression (4) holds. Denote
for all i; j 2 N and i > max i ; d i and j > max j ; d j :
We proceed to show that the fact that (Y; u; !) may not be a singleton does not a¤ect the comonotonicity of the utility shares. In particular, despite the fact that S breaks ties along a non-decreasing path, this is not automatic as the path may not pass through (Y; u; !):
It follows from elementary convex optimization arguments that if (Y; u; !) is not a singleton, then lim! t!! (Y; u;! t ) is a singleton for any sequence of R n + , f! t g t2N , such that! t 6 = ! for all t and lim t!1!t = !. Therefore, an argument similar to that in Case 1, applied to the sequences f! t g t2N implies that, for any Y ). See Figure  2 . Thus, the fact that S breaks ties along a non-decreasing path yields the desired result, regardless of whether this path passes through (Y; u; !) or (Y 0 ; u; !).
For necessity, let S be a generalized utilitarian bargaining solution and let u 2 U N be a utility pro…le which does not satisfy Almost TU. Consider a production possibility set, Y 1 R L + , and let y 2 @Y 1 be an e¢ cient product mix, so that a 2 EX (y; u) in the economy (Y 1 ; u). By e¢ ciency:
for any pair of agents i and j and any pair of goods l and m. (Y 1 ; u) . Therefore,
is not Pareto e¢ cient in the economy
for all i; j 2 N and all l; m 2 L but
for some pair l; m of goods. Without loss of generality, suppose that
; for all i; j 2 N . Now construct another production possibility set, Y 2 R L + , such that y 2 @Y 2 and
for all l; m 2 L and all i; j 2 N , as shown in Figure 3 in the two-agent case. Similarly, because the allocation (y; b) 2 P (Y 2 ; u)nP (Y 1 ; u), there exists a utility vector b1 2 @U (Y 1 ; u) which dominates b2 2 @U (Y 2 ; u); i.e. b1 > b2 .
From the two previous arguments, and from the continuity of @U (Y 1 ; u) and @U (Y 2 ; u), it must be that @U (Y 1 ; u) and @U (Y 2 ; u) cross at some point in the utility space. Denote by 12 2 @U (Y 1 ; u) \ @U (Y 2 ; u) such a point.
We now show that there exist bargaining situations where a change from the production possibility set Y 1 to Y 2 will bene…t some agents while hurting others. Consider a disagreement point, d 2 U (Y 1 ; u), such that S(U (Y 1 ; u); d) = 12 ; i.e., such that 12 = arg max 2U (Y1;u)
. Such a disagreement point exists due to the continuity, concavity, and the strict monotonicity properties of the i 's, if S 2 G or, if S 2 W, due to the fact that S. breaks ties along a path. Therefore, invoking again the concavity and strict monotonicity of the i 's, and the fact that @U (Y 1 ; u) and @U (Y 2 ; u) cross at 12 , it follows that S(U (Y 2 ; u); d) 6 = 12 .
11 Finally, it follows from the fact that U (Y 2 ; u) is convex and comprehensive that S(U (Y 2 ; u); d) neither dominates nor is dominated by S(U (Y 1 ; u); d).
Remark 1 For many GUBS not belonging to G [ W; where the 0 i s are not strictly concave everywhere, the proof of Theorem 1 readily applies.
Remark 2 Note that Chun and Thomson (1988) 's one-good economy is a special case of our economy; with L = 1; and y 1 given, it follows that P i2N v i = P x 1i and (y 1 ; f (u)) = y 1 :
Remark 3 In the case of identical utility functions and a symmetric GUBS, if d is symmetric, the solidarity property is satis…ed even if the bargaining solution is not well-behaved. Indeed, by symmetry of U ( ; u), it is impossible that @U (Y 1 ; u) and @U (Y 2 ; u) cross where i = j for all i; j 2 N ; yet, a symmetric GUBS will always select a 2 @U ( ; u) such that i = j for all i; j 2 N .
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Applications
Theorem 1 has important policy implications. For example, research on family economics frequently uses bargaining rules -most often the Nash bargaining solution -to analyze intrafamily distribution. In this literature parameters that change the disagreement point without changing the utility possibility set (McElroy 1990 refers to them as extrahousehold environmental parameters) have received substantial attention (Lundberg et al. 1997 , Rubalcava and Thomas 2000 , Chiappori et al. 2002 , but policies that have the potential to a¤ect the disagreement point as well as the utility possibility set are more di¢ cult to analyze. Examples of policies a¤ecting the utility possibility set and maybe the disagreement point are parental leave policies, policies subsidizing child care, and family taxation. We focus on the latter in the application below.
Change in Family Tax Policy
Many tax expenditures and provisions in income taxation have a quite complex impact on a family's full budget set. For example, the question of whether to tax couples jointly or individually changes the household's production function of income. To …x ideas consider the following model based on Gugl (2009) . Consider a household consisting of two spouses (i = f; m) as the set of agents. Each spouse cares about his or her consumption of a private good (x 1i ) and consumption of a household public good (x 2 ). Hence, a spouse's utility function is given by u i (x 1i ; x 2 ) : Total time endowment of each spouse is denoted by T; which can be divided between employment (l i ) towards purchasing the point is una¤ected by changes in the joint production possibilities.
1 2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this observation.
16 private good (x 1f + x 1m = y 1 ) and home production (t i ) to produce y 2 . 13 Then a spouse's time constraint is given by l i + t i = T:
Household production is given by
where h f and h m both satisfy the following properties: h i (0) = 0; @hi @ti > 0; and
Household Net Income A person's taxable income is given by the product of his or her wage rate (w i ) times the hours worked (l i ) : Let ind (w i l i ) be the net wage of a person if taxed individually. Given a progressive tax on wages, ind (:) is a strictly increasing and concave function. Thus @ ind @wili w i is the marginal net-wage rate of spouse i:
14
Under joint taxation the net wage of the family as a whole is given by joint (w f l f + w m l m ) : Given a progressive tax on wages, joint (:) is a strictly concave function of the household's wage,
is the marginal net-wage rate of spouse i under joint taxation:
15
Normalizing the price of the private good to 1, the household budget constraint is given by
under individual taxation, and by
under joint taxation. The couple's production possibility frontier, @Y; is found by max (y 1 ; y 2 ) subject to constraints (6) and (7) under individual taxation and (6) and (8) under joint taxation. A change from individual to joint taxation is a rather complex change and it is possible that @Y ind and @Y joint intersect.
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Let the disagreement point be determined by the stand-alone utility of each spouse, i.e. a person's utility before marriage. Thus the tax schedule applied 1 3 Home production can be interpreted as raising children, but can also stand for taking care of household chores like cooking, doing laundry, cleaning the house, gardening etc.
1 4 Since the tax schedule starts at a zero tax rate and then increases the tax rate with wage income, 0 < in the disagreement point is individual taxation and does not change with a change in family taxation. 17 Pollak (2006) argues that even if the disagreement point is determined by a non-cooperative game of spouses and not by the standalone utility, it should not change with a change in family taxation. He also concludes that "joint taxation provides incentives for specialization but [...] the distributional e¤ects of joint taxation, which operate through the feasible set, are indeterminant" (Pollak 2006, p. 29) . Assuming Almost TU o¤ers a less ambiguous answer.
Proposition 1 If spouses have utility functions that lead to Almost TU and use a well-behaved GUBS to determine intrafamily distribution, both people either bene…t or lose jointly with a change from individual taxation to joint taxation.
Even if the disagreement point changes, as this would be the case if the tax schedule for singles also changes as part of a fundamental tax reform, Almost TU allows us to decompose the impact of a change in income taxation into a "utility possibility set" e¤ect (family members share the gain or the pain) and a "disagreement point" e¤ect (di¤erent family members may experience changes in their utility at the disagreement point in opposing directions). 18 In order to evaluate changes in family taxation, it is therefore useful to know whether GUBS plus Almost TU is a good approximation to household behavior.
Almost TU implies that a product mix is e¢ cient independently of distribution. Yet empirical studies have found that a change in the disagreement point without changing the utility possibility set of spouses leads to a di¤erent household expenditure pattern or division of labor (e.g. Lundberg et. al 1997 , Rubaclava and Thomas 2000 , Chiappori et al. 2002 . A change in expenditures on male vs. female clothing or male vs. female entertainment goods when interpreted as changes in expenditures on private consumption goods would be consistent with a model in which spouses have utilities over a household public good (corresponding to y 2 above) and disposable income (corresponding to y 1 above) that lead to Almost TU. A change in the division of labor, however, either refutes the assumption of Almost TU in the family bargaining context or suggests that more is going on than what is captured in a one-period model. 
Incentive Compatibility
So far, we have considered exogenous changes in the production possibility set and assumed that agents produce e¢ ciently the goods that they share according to a GUBS. Now suppose that agents choose their actions non-cooperatively to produce goods. In particular, denote by A i the action set of an agent and by a i 2 A i a speci…c action taken by agent i: Denote by a i the actions taken by all the other agents except agent i:
Theorem 2 (Incentive Compatibility) If agents use a S 2 G [ W to determine the distribution of a given product mix y (a), the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of the game in which agents sequentially choose their actions is e¢ cient if and only if Almost TU holds.
Proof. Su¢ ciency: By Almost TU and Theorem 1, S satis…es solidarity. Therefore, all agents seek to maximize (y(a); u). The fact that agents play a sequential game eliminates the possibility of a coordination problem and, hence, agents will non-cooperatively reach a vector of actions a 2 arg max a2 Q i2N Ai (y(a); u):
Necessity follows from Theorem 1: Only if Almost TU holds does a solution in G [ W guarantee that agents have a common goal (i.e., to maximize (y(a); u)).
Remark 4 While we establish incentive compatibility in a context where agents act sequentially (Theorem 2), it is worth noticing that a similar result holds in a simultaneous-move game. Indeed, using S 2 G [ W ensures that the agents' interests are aligned; hence, once coordination issues have been resolved, say, by cooperatively agreeing on a production plan ex ante, unilateral deviations from the e¢ cient plan are unpro…table.
Incentive Compatibility and Household Decision Making
The above model of spousal decision making also satis…es incentive compatibility in case of Almost TU: Both spouses have an incentive to provide the e¢ cient amount of labor.
Corollary 1 Suppose spouses agree to divide produced goods based on a wellbehaved GUBS but choose their labor supply individually. Each spouse chooses the e¢ cient labor supply if and only if Almost TU holds.
The Rotten Kid Theorem
Theorem 2 has also implications for Gary Becker (1974) 's Rotten Kid Theorem. Bergstrom (1989) formalizes the game that rotten kids play with their altruistic parent: In comparison with the model of spousal decision making introduced above, children now take the place of the spouses; each child's action impacts the production possibility set of the family. The parent in this game has a …xed amount of money at her disposal and, after observing her kids' actions, determines monetary transfers to her o¤spring by maximizing her altruistic utility function. Thus, the parent's altruistic preferences play the same role that the GUBS plays in the model of spousal decision making. Children thus take into account how the parent will react to their actions when they choose their own actions. The Rotten Kid Theorem states that even if the children are completely sel…sh and care only about their own consumption, they will behave as if they are maximizing the parent's altruistic utility function. Bergstrom (1989) 's proof of the Rotten Kid Theorem requires TU, because he assumes that the parent treats every child's utility as a normal good in her altruistic utility function: Only if any action by a child, given the actions of all the other children results in a restricted utility possibility set in the form of a simplex are all the children guaranteed to bene…t from taking e¢ cient actions. In comparison to Bergstrom, we can weaken the requirement of TU to Almost TU by imposing a stronger, yet reasonable condition on the parent's altruistic utility function.
Corollary 2 Suppose the parent's altruistic utility function takes on the form of a general utilitarian social welfare function. Each child behaves as if he/she would maximize the altruistic utility function of the parent if and only if children's utility functions lead to Almost TU.
Conclusion
Many normatively appealing properties are also crucial in determining positive questions. 20 The solidarity property is no exception. We showed that for well-behaved General Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions the solidarity property is satis…ed if and only if Almost TU holds. We then showed that if the agents can agree on how to distribute goods once they are produced, but choose their actions individually, incentive compatibility is satis…ed if and only if the GUBS satis…es the solidarity property.
Almost TU is an important subdomain of all utility pro…les and we believe Almost TU, combined with GUBS, to be a useful approach to modelling joint decisions in a variety of economic situations. We are also aware that one may take the opposite view, seeing our result as a damnation of GUBS because Almost TU seems to be rarely satis…ed in practice. In that case, the question becomes which class of bargaining solutions should take their place. The one that comes to mind immediately is the egalitarian solution (i.e., the solution that equally splits utility gains) or any other solution that plots a monotonic path through the disagreement point and pays no attention to the shape of the utility possibility set. It is obvious that such solutions satisfy the solidarity property and therefore incentive compatibility regardless of whether the utility pro…le leads to Almost TU or not.
However, such speci…cations are not without their own drawbacks. For example, consider a two stage game, in which agents can choose actions in the …rst stage that impact their disagreement utility as well as their joint production possibilities in the second stage. The second stage consists of the joint production and distribution of goods as modelled in this paper. The more bargaining solu-2 with respect to (x 12 ; x 32 ) : By homogeneity of degree 1 of the utility functions, we also know that an increase in the share of I causes a proportional increase in u i : Hence, the indirect utility function of agent 1 writes as follows (p 2 ; I 1 ) = e (p 2 ) I 1 where e (p 2 ) = max 
This implies that as agent 1's share of I increases by one unit, her utility increases by e (p 2 ), and agent 2's utility decreases by e (p 3 ) : Independent of how many units of I are already allocated to person 1, the decrease in person 2's utility and the increase in person 1's utility will always be the same as person 1 receives an additional unit of I: Therefore any ( 1 ; 2 ) is found by 2 = (Y; u 2 ) e (p 3 ) e (p 2 ) 1 :
Also note that e (p 3 ) e (p 2 ) = e (p 
